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In the recent case of the Department of Revenue v. McIlvain'
the Kentucky Court of Appeals was called upon to interpret Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes 134.210, relative to the office of special tax
collector. In arriving at their interpretation of the statute the Court
relied upon the following expressed rules of statutory interpretation:
"In the interpretation, of writings, including statutes
the primary factor to be considered is to determine the
intent of the maker and which in turn is to be determined
by the language employed. If that language is plain and
unambiguous its meaning should be upheld as so ex-
pressed, uninfluenced by any unwise or unusual result
that might follow the upholding of the plainly expressed
writing or statute, which is but following frequent ex-
pressions of courts to the effect that the intention to be
gathered from employed language is the one that it plain-
ly expresses, and not the one that may have been in the
mind of the composer, but which he failed to express.
In other words, the intention is gathered from what the
writers of such documents, including statutes, actually
said and not what they may have intended to but did not
say."
2
The Court failed to cite authority for their statement of these
rules of statutory interpretation and it must be presumed that the
Court considered such rules so well settled in this state as not tp
require citation of authority. This is a definite commitment that
Kentucky follows the "plain meaning rule" of statutory interpreta-
tion. That is, in the absence of any ambiguity, the plain meaning
of the words employed, in their common usage, is deemed to be the
intent of the legislature regardless of anything to the contrary which
may be shown by extrinsic evidence.3
While the Court undoubtedly arrived at the correct interpreta-
tion of the statute in question, it did not confine its reasoning to the
plain meaning of the words employed, but developed the legislative
and judicial history of the statute. The controversy arose from a
provision of Kentucky Revised Statutes 134.210 providing for the
compensation of the outgoing sheriff who has elected to act as special
tax collector after the expiration of his term of office. The Court
points out that the statute plainly provides that the compensation
of the office of special tax collector "shall be the same as provided
by law for the sheriff of the county in which the duties are per-
-302 Ky. 558, 195 S.W. 2d 63 (1946).2 Department of Revenue v. Mcllvain, 302 Ky. 558 at 561, 195
S.W. 2d 63 at 64.
'Horack, In the Name of Legislative Intent (1932) 38 W. VA.
L. Q. 119; Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the
Interpretation of Federal Statutes (1939) 25 WASH. U. L. Q. 2; Jones,
Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intent (1940) 40 COL. L. R. 957.
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formed, except that the special tax collector's personal compensation
shall not exceed $2083.35."' By applying the "plain meaning rule"
alone the Court would have been required to go no further to reach
their construction of the statute. But the Court did go further to
show that the question under consideration originated with an act
of the 1928 Legislature which had been interpreted by the Court
of Appeals in Madison County v. Hamriltone to have created the office
of delinquent tax collector and since the compensation for the office
had not been specified in the act it should be a reasonable amount
derived by way of commission on the taxes collected in the manner
prescribed by law for sheriffs. The Court points out that by an act
of the Legislature in 19327 the provisions of the 1928 act were
amended to provide that "the income of the outgoing sheriff arising
from the commissions for the collection of taxes shall be treated as
a part of the income of the sheriff for the preceding year," but that
this latter provision did not appear in the amendment and re-enact-
ment of the statute in 1940', which is the statute under considera-
tion. This development of the history of the statute through its
various amendments would indicate that the Court relied on past
decisions of the Court of Appeals and the inferences that can be
drawn from the legislative history of the statute in addition to the
plain meaning of the words used in arriving at their interpretation.
Confining the discussion solely to those cases wherein there has
been no allegation of ambiguity in the language of the statute, only
a cursory examination of the Kentucky cases dealing with statutory
interpretation is required to raise some doubt in the mind of the ob-
server as to the conclusiveness of the Court's statements in the
McIlvain case. But one need not rely wholly on the former ex-
pressions of the Court, but may look to the Kentucky Revised
Statutes to confirm his doubts of the conclusiveness of these rules.
The Legislature, in Kentucky Revised Statutes 446.080 , has laid
the rules for the interpretation of the Kentucky Revised Statutes,.
stating:
"(1) All statutes of this state shall be liberally
construed with a view to promote their objects and carry
out the intent of the legislature, and the rule that
'Ky. R. S. (1944) 134. 210, subsection (3).
'Kentucky Acts (1928), Chapter 128, p. 438; KENTUCKY STATUTES
(Carroll, 1930) Sec. 4135.
0243 Ky. 29, 47 S.W. 2d 938, 939 (1932).
Kentucky Acts (1932), Chapter 129, p. 628 at 630.
'Kentucky Acts (1940), Chapter 163, p. 641.
'This statute first appeared in THE REVISED STATUTES OF KEN-
TUCKY of 1851-52 as Sections 14, 15, 16, and 17 of Chapter XXI and
was adopted from New York and Massachusetts. These sections
were combined in the 1892 revision of the GENERAL STATUTES and
appeared as Sections 459 and 460 of Chapter 26 in the 1894 edition of
the KENTUCKY STATUTES. These sections remained in this form
through the various revisions and editions of the KENTUCKY STATUTES
until the 1942 revision when they appeared as Ky. R. S. 446.080.
IKENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly
construed shall not apply to the statutes of this state.
"(2) There shall be no difference in the construction
of civil, penal and criminal statutes.
"(4) All words and phrases shall be construed ac-
cording to the common and approved usage of language,
but technical words and phrases and such others as may
have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the
law, shall be construed according to such meaning.""
From this statute it would appear that the statutes of this state
should be interpreted to carry out the intention of the Legislature as
indicated by the objects of the statutes and not merely to carry out
the plain meaning of the language used, regardless of consequences,
and the obvious intent of the legislature,' as ruled in the McIlvain
case.
In the majority of the cases wherein the Court has cited Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes 446.080, or its predecessors, the result has
been that the legislative intent, as derived from sources other than
the plain meaning of the words used, has been the controlling factor
in the interpretation given 2 In a few cases the Court has recognized
the statute, but has declared that it was not controlling or that a
strict literal interpretation of the statute should be made notwith-
standing the admonition of the statute on construction.'- On other
"'See also: KENTUCKY CIVIL CODE (Carroll, 1938) Sec. 733.
'Wood Oil Co. v. Commonwealth, 196 Ky. 196, 244 S.W. 429
(1922); Green v. Moore, 281 Ky. 305, 135 S.W. 2d 682 (1939).
"In Bailey v. Commonwealth, 74 Ky. 688 (1876) the court was
asked to construe section 5, art. 29, chap. 29, of the General Statutes
which provided that it would not be unlawful for a person to carry a
concealed deadly weapon "when the person has reasonable ground
to believe his person or the person of some member of his family,
or his property, is in immediate danger from violence or crime."
The court referred to Sec. 17 of Chap. 21 of the GENERAL STATUTES
(Ky. R. S. 446.080, subsection (4)) and to the dictionary definition
of the word "immediate" which was given as, "having nothing in-
tervening either as to place, time or action." The court held that
the use of the word immediate in its ordinary meaning would lead
to the absurd result that a man might not arm himself until his
adversary was present, and that "every statute ought to be expound-
ed, not according to the letter, but according to the meaning" and
that "every interpretation that leads to an absurdity ought to be
rejected."
See also: Comm. ex. rel. Martin v. Tom Moore Distillery, 287
Ky. 125, 152 S.W. 2d 962 (1939); Holliday v. Fields, 210 Ky. 179,
275 S.W. 642 (1925); Gibson v. Commonwealth, 209 Ky. 101, 272 S.W.
43 (1925); Newport Benevolent Burial'Assn. v. Clay, 170 Ky. 633,
186 S.W. 658 (1916).
'In Phoenix Third National Bank v. Martin, 219 Ky. 579, 293
S.W. 1064 (1927), Sec. 550, KENTUCKY STATUTES (1922) prescribing
the liability of directors of private corporations who failed to comply
with the various statutes governing their conduct was interpreted
by the court, stating: "Section 550, Ky. Stats., imposing a burden-
some liability on delinquent directors, is a drastic law, and on its
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occasions, however, the court recognized that Kentucky Revised
Statutes 446.080, or its forerunners, does change the common law
rules of statutory interpretation to some extent and that the rules
set out in the statute are controlling in his state.4 The confusion
which appears in the cases wherein the statute on construction is
cited is but a small indication of the great confusion that exists
generally in the field of statutory interpretation in this state.
The Court can find an ample number of cases to support its
statement of the plain meaning rule in the McIlvain case.' But
face, it is absolute. . . . Nevertheless, it is intrinsically a penal
statute, for the same state of facts that would make corporate officers
and directors civilly liable would make them criminally liable also.
It is true that section 459, Ky. Stats., provides 'that there shall be
no distinction in the construction of statutes, between criminal or
civil and penal enactments.' But, without stopping to discuss the
sense or significance of this provision, I am satisfied that the
statute in question, both in its civil and in its penal aspect, should
be construed strictly-strictly, at least, in the sense that it ought
not be extended beyond its fair scope and reasonable intendment."
Dennison v. Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 366, 270 S.W. 752 (1925)
held that the word "storehouse" as used in 1169 KENTUCKY STATUTES
(1922) describing the offense of burning a "storehouse" on which
there was insurance, did not include the offense of burning a store-
house where the contents only were insured, citing Kentucky
Statutes, Sec. 460.
" Sutton v. Sutton, 87 Ky. 216, 8 S.W. 337, (1888); Common-
wealth v. Davis, 75 Ky. 240 (1876); See also: Fidelity & Columbia
Trust Co. v. Meeks, 294 Ky. 122, 171 S.W. 2d 41 (1943).
" In Commonwealth v. Lipginski, 212 Ky. 366, 279 S.W. 339
(1926) the defendant was indicted for violation of the child labor
laws, sub-section 15 of section 331A, KENTUCKY STATUTES (1922),
which provides in part:
1. "No boy under fourteen years of age . . . shall be employed
. . . in connection with the street occupations of peddling, boot-
blacking, the distribution or sale of newspapers, magazines,
periodicals or circulars. .."
2. "No boy between 14 and 16 years of age shall be employed
in connection with the street occupations of peddling, boot-
blacking, the distribution or sale of magazines, periodicals or
circulars..."
The defendant had employed a boy between fourteen and six-
teen to sell newspapers and was charged with the violation of the
second section above quoted. The defendant argued that the word
"newspaper" did not appear in that section and therefore the in-
dictment was bad. The Commonwealth argued that the word
"newspaper" had been omitted from the section by inadvertence,
oversight or mistake. In holding the indictment bad, the Court said:
"We conclude that the act must be considered as presented by the
Legislature without the interpolation of words which may appear
to some were intended to be but were not employed by the lawmak-
ing body in the enactment of the statutes..."
In the often cited case of Hewlett v. Springfield, 210 Ky. 199,
275 S.W. 385 (1925) the Court said: "We fully appreciate the fact
that ... was perhaps not the actual intention of the legislature, but
as has often been said, the legislative intent may not be gathered
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there is a respectable number of well-considered decisions wherein
the Court has faced the problem of interpreting a clearly unambig-
uous statute, admitted to be unambiguous by the Court, expressly
or by inference, where they have refused to invoke the "plain
meaning rule."'"
The Court points out in the McIlvain case that the intention of
the legislature is to be gathered from what the legislature actually
said, not what they intended to say.
But in Dougherty v. Kentucky Alcoholic Beverage Control
Board" the Court was asked to interpret Section 2554b-177, 1939
Supplement, Kentucky Statutes" which provides:
"No license for the sale of alcoholic beverages at
retail, shall be granted for any premises which shall be
located on the same street or avenue, and within two
hundred feet of a building occupied exclusively as a school,
hospital, church or other place of worship. . . The
measurement called for in this section shall be taken on
the street or avenue on which the licensed premises are
located in a straight line from the nearest property line of
the property on which is located the building used as a
church . . . to the nearest property line of the real
estate on which is located the building for which the
license is sought."
The Court revoked a license issued to a country crossroads store
to sell liquor and from the language quoted below it is submitted that
the Court relied upon the intention of the legislature as drawn from
other factors than the plain meaning of the words used.
"We have pointed out the word 'highway' is com-
monly used to signify a public road in the country, and
that a thoroughfare in a city or town is referred to or
designated as a street * * "
"It is a familiar rule of statutory construction that
the entire act is to be considered with the judicial eye
upon the historical setting, the public policy, the objects
from what the General Assembly failed to say, but from what it
actually did say..."
See also: Plummer et al. v. City of Vanceburg, 275 Ky. 713,
122 S.W. 2d 772 (1938); Hurley Co. v. Martin, 267 Ky. 182, 101
S.W. 2d 657 (1936); Lewis v. Creasey Corp., 198 Ky. 409, 248 S.W.
1046 (1923); Western and Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Weber, 183 Ky.
32, 209 S.W. 716 (1919); James v. J. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., of
N. Y., 133 Ky. 299, 117 S.W. 406 (1909).
" Oates v. Simpson, Tax Commissioner, 295 Ky. 433, 174 S.W.
2d 505 (1943); Swift v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 294 Ky. 137,
171 S.W. 2d 49 (1943); Reeves v. Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co.,
293 Ky. 544, 169 S.W. 2d 621 (1942); Commonwealth v. Bartholomew,
265 Ky. 703, 97 S.W. 2d 591 (1936); Golightly v. Bailey, 218 Ky.
794, 292 S.W. 320 (1927); Felts v. Edwards, 181 Ky. 287, 204 S.W.
145 (1918).
'"279 Ky. 262, 130 S.W. 2d 756 (1939).
'-Ky. R. S. 243.220 (3). Sections 2554b-174, 2554b-175, and
2554b-177 of KENTUCKY STATUTES (1939 Supp.) have been in-
corporated into this section.
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to be accomplished, the mischief intended to be remedied,
and all other attendant facts and circumstances which
throw intelligent light upon the intention of the law-mak-
ing body . . . The reason and spirit of the law must
be considered. If a literal -meaning of the language used
would defeat the intention, such will not be given it for -
the real purpose of the legislature must prevail over the
literal import of the words used ... It cannot be thought
that the legislature intended to leave schools, hospitals,
churches, and other places of religious worship in the
country or unincorporated villages unprotected from the
influence of places where intoxicating liquors are dis-
pensed and at the same time intended to afford such pro-
tection in a town or city."' 9
In Martin v. Louisville Motors" the Court was asked to construe
Kentucky Statutes (1930) Sec. 2739g-2(a) as amended by Acts of
1936, c. 67, concerning motor vehicle registration. In arriving at
their interpretation the Court laid down several rules of statutory
interpretation which they considered controlling in this state. The
Court quoted from Sams v. Sams' Admr.Y as follows:
"It is a well settled rule of construction that the letter
of a statute will not be followed where it will lead to an
absurd conclusion; but, on the contrary, the reason for the
enactment must enter into its interpretation, so as to de-
termine what was intended to be accomplished by it."
Again in the same opinion the Court quoted from Nentzel v.
Ryan:
"The purpose is to give effect to the legislative intent.
The will of the Legislature, not its words, are (sic) the
law."
No attempt will be made to discuss the various methods the
Court of Appeals has employed to discover the legislative intent
where the plain meaning rule is not invoked. It is submitted how-
ever that rules of statutory interpretation laid down in the Mcllvain
case, which are but a clear statement of the "plain meaning rule,"
are not necessarily controlling in this state and that the court can,
and often does, employ other means than the plain meaning of the
words used to ascertain the intent of the legislature when inter-
preting an unambiguous statute.
W. H. COLDIRON
" Dougherty v. Kentucky Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 279
Ky. 262 at 266-267, 130 S.W. 2d 756 at 759-760 (1939).
2- 276 Ky. 696, 125 S.W. 2d 241 (1939).
85 Ky. 396, 3 S.W. 593 (1887).
184 Ky. 292, 211 S.W. 852 (1919).
